Values (7) The Fact-Value Distinction

Let us briefly review the fact-value distinction itself, then turn to its collapse. The fact-value distinction arises in Western philosophy of ethics.* It is invoked to avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy in argument. A fact is a true statement of an existing or past state of affairs in nature or in society. The statement, "Objects with mass fall from rest with an accelerated motion equal to [(1*g*t^2)/2] to the surface of the earth in earth's gravitational field", is a fact. The statement, "The living room of the house at 35 Riverdale Street, Trenton, New Jersey, contained two stuffed chairs on August 17, 1984", is a fact, if true. A value in ethics is a statement of moral obligation. The statements, "It is wrong to kill another human being", is a verbal statement of the moral value prohibiting murder.

Since the rise of modern science, four hundred years ago, many thinkers believed that increasing scientific knowledge would help humanity become more morally enlightened. Hope burgeoned in the nineteenth century, because Darwin's work helped us to understand better the role of our animal nature in our human behavior. Such hope assumes there is a connection between factual knowledge and moral obligation. The fact-value distinction, as employed by philosophers, denies such a connection, in at least one sense. It states that a fact cannot logically entail a moral obligation. An obligation cannot be deduced from a statement of fact. An "'ought' statement" cannot be deduced from an "'is' statement". You cannot deduce, because a statement of fact is true, that you are obligated do anything.

Here is an example. Suppose sociologists and anthropologists do a study that proves that killing of children is common in all human societies. They prove that infanticide is a universal human social trait. Can we infer any moral obligation from this fact? Could we infer, for instance, that it is okay to kill children? Could we infer that we ought to kill children, or at least some children? Could we infer that you or I, specifically, should go out and kill a child and it would be morally right for us to do so? Most of us would immediately say, no; the existence of infanticide does not obligate us to commit infanticide and does not make infanticide right.

When we deduce a value from a fact we make a particular kind of logical mistake that philosophers call the "naturalistic fallacy". We can turn the mistake around. It is equally a mistake to deduce a fact from a value. To continue the example above, suppose that sociologists and anthropologists prove that all human societies on earth, even isolated and remote groups, hold the value that killing a person is morally wrong. Could we deduce from the universal injunction against murder that no murders (as a fact) ever occur? Of course not.

The fact-value distinction is important, because it protect ethics and science from each other. The distinction places ethics in an intellectual and social realm where we can imagine an ideal world and debate about it. Our values are not simple reflections of our behavior. We can criticize our behavior, as we factually understand it, and try to make it better to meet moral standards we recognize. Science is also protected. Scientific investigation is logically free from distortion by the moral values of scientists and anyone else. The distinction prevents wishful moral thinking from clouding our study of how nature and society really are.

Contents

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Definitions Not Used
• 3. Popular Definition
• 4. Social Science Definitions
• 5. Philosophical Definition: Existentialism
• 6. Cultural Relativism
• 7. The Fact-Value Distinction
• 8. Collapsing the Fact-Value Distinction

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With a introductory survey knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, the Wikipedia article on the fact-value distinction is useful; but it over-emphasizes the importance of Nietzsche and does not adequately cover twentieth century developments. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact-value_distinction

Comments

[Matthew Speedy]

A reactionary can easily be spotted by the bemoaning of the fact/value distinction.

This is because it destroys the very idea of a mandarin class telling the herd what to do.

A democratic state automatically implies that policy decisions are not "true" or "false", but are the reflections of human needs and interests.

And surely, even a child can distinguish between a law of gravity and a law against murder. But this seems to pass over the wisdom of the modern mandarin class.